MR. BRADLEY AND THE SUPREME COURT.

ity an absolute bond before payment of the -money or performance of the duty for which he stood liable; before even the time
fixed for payment or performance by the principal had arrived.
That decision is conclusive. See also Tois8ant v. lartimant,2
T. R. 100; Penney v. oy, 8 B. & C. 11 (15 E. C. L. 147).
It results that the judgment confessed by J. F. Clements &
Co. to the sureties of Clements is valid as an obligation of the
firm, and the defendants are entitled against the partnership
creditors to the fruits of their execution.
Bill dismissed, and the injunction dissolved.
NoTE.-There were other questions raised and decided in this case, but they
depended upon statute law and were not of sufficiently general interest for publication.

MR. BRADLEY AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT'
OF COLUMBIA.-POSTSCRIPT.

IN our March number we had occasion to review the reeent
controversy between the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia and Mr. Bradley, and to express our opinion very
plainly on the conduct of both parties.
Since the publication of that article, we have received a very
courteous note from Mr. Bradley, calling attention to some points
in the case that we had not previously known, and that modify
somewhat the views we have expressed as to his temper in general,
and also as to the letter to Judge FISHER of August 6th 1867.
By Mr. Bradley's account, the charge of falsehood made to
Judge OLIN on a former occasion was in retort only to a charge
from the bench that he knew what he was stating to be false.
We should be very reluctant to admit any justification for a memher of the bar to speak in terms of such flagrant disrespect to
a judge on the bench; but if judges so far forget themselves as
to engage frequently in angry personal altercations with the bar,
we, who practise under a code of judicial ethics of so m'uch higher
standard, should be lenient to occasional departures from propriety by less fortunate lawyers.
A far more important matter, however, is the letter to Judge
FISHER of August 6th 1867; and concerning this Mr. Bradley,
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writes very earnestly that we have misunderstood his language
and intention. As this was the gravamen of the case in our
remarks, we very cheerfully give Mr. Bradley's own view of it.
He says: "But this I can and ought to say, in justice to the
gentlemen with whom I conferred, and who were acting with me
-not young men, but men of very high standing in the profession, and of high honor and very pure character, that neither
of them understood or intended it to be a challenge, and so far
from it, the oie who was to have acted with me, if my invitation
to Judge FISHER had been accepted, was not even to present a
challenge if we had met outside the District. My course was
perfectly defined in that event, and Judge FISHER and his friends
would have had no cause to complain of it. In addition to this,
let me say that no gentleman of my acquaintance who has ever
had anything to do with such itatters has put that construction
upon it. They, without exception, say it was an overture which
left the case open for future adjustment. Finally the matter was
laid before the grand jury of the Criminal Court at a term held
by Judge FISHER. He had caused my arrest and had me bound
over to appear at that term of the court. Yet, after a full investigation, the grand jury dismissed the complaint."
Viewing the letter in this light, the case was hardly one which
called for public comment; and, considering the disclaimer by
Mr. Bradley, and the opinions of his friends, the grand jury and
the court itself, as expressed by Judge WYLIE, we are disposed
to admit that the letter is not so clearly a challenge as to demand
the remarks we made upon the crime of offering violence to a
judge, though we still think ,it was unfortunately worded so as
most naturally to bear that construction.
The events subsequent to those narrated in our March number
may.be briefly stated.
On February 1st 1869, Mr. Bradley presented a written
apology to the court, which the court, thtough Judge WYLIE,
declared not satisfactory.
We have read this paper since writing the article, and think it
a reasonable and fair apology to the court. It does not say in
terms that Mr. Bradley was altogether in the wrong, still less
that Judge FISHER was entirely in the right, and no one should
expect that it would do so; but it does disclaim any intentional
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disrespect to the bench, express "profound regret" for any contempt of the court, and ask permission to recall and withdraw
any' act or expression which might be interpreted as an indignity
to the judicial tribunals of the District; and it states, apologetically, that he acted under "sudden impulse and continuous
excitement."
It could not be expected that Mr. Bradley should apologize
personally to Judge FISHER, whom he considered the original
aggressor, but to the court the apology was, it seems to us, as fair
and ample as any gentleman could be expected to make under the
circumstances, and when, after the expressions quoted, he goes
on lo show that the letter was not a challenge and to define his
position upon the rules and .orders of the court, objecting even
strenuously to the jurisdiction of the court to -punish him by
ex post facto order, we fail to discover anything disrespectful oy
beyond what a man may fairly do in his own vindication.
On February 6th 1869, Mr. Bradley having announced his
intention not to apply to the Criminal Court for restoration to
that bar, the Supreme Court of the District applied the rule of
January 26th to him, and he is not now allowed to practise in
that court. Whether Mr. Bradley proposes to submit to this
order and terminate this unpleasant affair here, we are not advised. To him personally we presume an exclusion from that
court would not be of much consequence; but 6onsidering the
ex post facto nature of the order as applied to him, and the
evasive compliance with the letter of the mandate from the Supreme Court of the United States, we think it unlikely that he
will rest under an apparent defeat. We hope that for the prevention of further scandal and discredit to the legal profession,
both at bar and on the bench, the court will reconsider its present
untenable position, and restore Mr. Bradley to his professional
rights, and that this may be the last occurrence of ihe kind we
may have to chronicle or allude to.
J. T. M.

